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3.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is about two agreements between a Farmer, Mr. Hull, and a Realtor/developer,
Mr. Giesler, who in 2005 first decided in a written agreement that the Farmer would transfer 147
acres of the Farmer's land to the Realtor/developer for a purchase price several thousands of
dollars less per acre than the then fair market value for the land. Both parties knew the land was
going to be used for a subdivision. The parties were prior business associates and friends. The
Realtor took the role of professional Realtor/developer. The Farmer took no part in the
development/expense of the actual subdivisions. The parties then orally agreed, that while the
property was being prepared by the Realtor for the first of several phases of subdivision, the
Farmer would continue to farm the land, paying the Realtor a reasonable rental rate for each year.
As part of the new agreement the Farmer was to retain a one-half interest in the net profit from
the sale of the subdivision lots, as long as he paid the D.L. Evans notes.
The first 40 acre subdivision was ready in 2006 whereupon the realtor offered the Farmer
$200,000.00 for his share, the Farmer accepted, and the Realtor paid. At the time of the original
transfer of the land the Realtor had taken out four loans from D.L. Evans Bank in the amount of
$184,786.00. The parties agreed as part of the second agreement that the Farmer would make the
loan payments on those loans even though the proceeds of the loans went to pay the Farmer in
the original transfer of real property, and used to payoff prior secured indebtedness on the land,
thus making the purchase price even that much less. The first D.L. Evans loan payment was
made by the Farmer when it was withheld from the $200,000.00 paid to the Farmer on the first
40 acre subdivision by the Realtor.
The original selling price was $2,500.00 per acre for 147 acres, or $367,500.00. Subtract
the $184,786.00 for the D.L. Evans loans, leaves an actual price per acre ofless than $1,250.00.
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The parties had previously agreed on $7,000.00 per acre for part of the 147 acres, and
adjacent land had sold recently for more than $10,000.00 per acre. (Plaintiff's Exhibits "4" and
"33" p. 22, 3rd ~; and "Tr" p. 370, L. 18-22 and p. 371, L. 1-2).
The cost of the water shares and irrigation equipment that were transferred pursuant to the
written agreement exceed the remaining value paid to Hull after factoring the D.L. Evans loan.
("Tr" p. 148, L. 21-25) and (Memorandum Opinion 26; "R" p. 213).
From 2007 through 2013 the Farmer paid to the realtor sufficient monies each year to
make the payment on the D.L. Evans notes, including a payment in 2009 to cover paying off the
first of the four notes to clear the first 40 acre subdivision. The Farmer has paid $161,580.17,
including interest, on the D.L. Evan's loans to date. (Memorandum Opinion p. 14,29;
"R" p. 201, 216 and Notice of Payment, "R" p. 244).
The Farmer had claimed equitable trust theories arguing for an actual legal interest in the
remaining 107 acres. The District Court found that because there existed a signed copy of their
agreement, which included an integration clause, that what was agreed to, if anything, prior to the
written agreement, did not apply. The District Court, however, also found that there was
adequate evidence of an agreement after the initial sale which gave the Farmer his one half
interest in the net profit from the sale oflots in the remaining 107 acres. (Plaintiff's Exhibit
"31", Giesler's Notes-agreement ifD.L. Evans loans were paid and the payment of $200,000.00
on the first 40 acres subdivision).
In the fall of 2012 the Realtor, who had done nothing of a physical nature to improve the
remaining 107 acres since the first 40 acre subdivision in 2006, attempted to have the Farmer
evicted from the 107 acres, claiming that all the land belonged to him and that the Farmer had no
right to farm the land or to any profit therefrom. Realtor also wanted all the Farmer's irrigation
equipment at the time of the original transfer. Realtor had to let Farmer finish the 2011-2012
farming season as a matter oflaw, as a hold over tenant. The Farmer had irrigation equipment on
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the property for irrigation of more than 700 other acres that he either owned or rented at that
time. The irrigation equipment consisted of hand lines, portable main lines, pumps, and panels
(all located on his brother's property known as the hydro project).
The District Court found, that as irrigation equipment in general was mentioned in the
written agreement, only an amount sufficient to irrigate the 147 acres went to the Realtor. The
Court also ruled, that had the irrigation equipment remained on the land, it would eventually
have been sold as part of the subdivision development and one-half of the value there of would
belong to Hull. (Memorandum Opinion p. 26; "R" p. 213).
The Realtor Counterclaimed for unpaid rent. The Farmer claimed he should only have to
pay rent for one half of the 107 acres during the years of 2006-20 12, but as the District Court
found an absolute transfer of the land to the Realtor, the Farmer had to pay rent for the whole, not
just half.
The Realtor did not perform according to the oral agreement found by the District Court,
in that little or nothing had been done toward subdividing the remaining 107 acres in the last
seven years, in fact the Realtor had worked on subdividing adjacent property to which he had
interest.("Tr", as to lost entitlements to the property in question, p. 346, L. 20-22). The Realtor
also agreed that Hell could freeze over before the Farmer got any more money. ("Tr" p. 338,
L. 14-17 and Memorandum Opinion p. 20; "R" p. 207).

The Farmer had paid $271,077.96 to the Realtor from 2006-2012. (Plaintiffs Exhibit
"13"; and Memorandum Opinion p. 30; "R" p. 217). The District Court then awarded a money
judgment to the Realtor in the amount of $58,311.87, which was less than the one-half of the rent
found owing to the Realtor. The District Court further ordered that the Realtor must perform
under the agreement, that is complete the remaining three subdivisions, one per year, for the next
three years and sell the lots giving the Farmer his one-half share of the net profit. The Farmer
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also had to continue to payoff, in full, the D.L. Evan's notes. The District Court felt that when
there was no time expressed in the contract for its performance, the law implies that it shall be
performed within in reasonable time as determined by the subject matter of the contract, the
situation of the parties, and the circumstances attending the performance. (Memorandum Opinion
p. 20; "R" p. 207 and Judgment p. 2; "R" p. 231). The District Court also set consequences for
both parties if either one further breached the agreement and retained jurisdiction in the case.
(Judgment p.I-3; "R" p. 230-232).
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4.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Whether the District Court erred by holding that Hull retained any interest in the 107 Acres,
Water Rights or Irrigation Equipment, equitable or otherwise; or not.
Whether the District Court erred by fashioning a remedy for breach of contract when Hull had
failed to sufficiently prove actual or anticipated damages with reasonable certainty and when the
District Court's remedies were outside of the relief requested by Hull, unsupported by evidence
in the record or were unreasonable, arbitrary and unenforceable; or not.
Whether the District Court erred by the only awarding Giesler one half of the value of the
Irrigation Equipment and also ordering that the pro rata value of the Irrigation Equipment be
factored into the calculation of "net profits" from the sale of subdivided lots; or not.
Whether either party is entitled to Costs and Attorneys Fees on appeal pursuant to the Purchase
and Sale Agreement and Idaho law, including LA.R. 41, LC.§ 12-120(3) and/or LC.§ 12-121.
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5.

ARGUMENT
A.

Standard of Review
Appellants correctly set out the standard of review on Appeal. In a bench trial the judge is

the ultimate finder of fact. He weighs conflicting evidence and testimony, and judges the
credibility of witnesses. His tindings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, even if
conflicting. The Appellate Court should not substitute its own view of the facts, but is free to
exercise full review over matters of law. (See Cases cited in Appellant's Brief v. Argument, A.
Standard of Review, p. 12).

B.

Whether the district court erred by holding that Hull retained an interest in the
remaining 107 Acres, the 13 Shares of Extra Water, or Irrigation Equipment,
equitable or otherwise; or not.
The District Court held that because there existed a written agreement between the

parties, signed by Hull for the sale of the original 147 acres in question, which included an
integration clause, that Hull retained no undivided legal interest in the property, but instead had
only a conditional undivided interest in the net profits from the sale of the developed lots, based
on a subsequent oral agreement between the parties. (Memorandum Opinion p. 7, 10-11;

"R" p. 194, 197-198).
Hull originally claimed under equitable trust theories that he had retained an undivided
one-half legal interest in the property, but the court ruled otherwise. The District Court was
however not blind to what followed; Giesler's payment of $200,000.00 to Hull for the first 40
acre finished subdivision, his acknowledgment of the equitable interest to Hull in his own notes,
and his withholding the first D.L. Evans loan payment of $20, 107.46 from the $200,000.00 paid
to Hull. (Plaintiffs Exhibit "31 "; Giesler's Notes, p. 1- 2).
Appellants cited cases on this issue which are not on point, as a new contract was entered
into later, evidenced by Giesler's payment to Hull on the first 40 acre subdivision and his
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withholding of the first D.L. Evans loan payment. Ifthere was not a trust in the first instance, as
the District Court found, then there was a meeting of the minds on the material provisions
sufficient to create an enforceable contract in the second agreement of the parties. (Memorandum
Opinion p.7; "R" p. 194).
'-Formation of a valid contract requires a meeting of the minds as evidenced by a
manifestation of mutual intent to contract. Inland Title Co. V Comstock, 116 Idaho 701,
703, 779 P.2d 15,17 (1989). This manifestation takes the form of an offer followed by an
acceptance." Id. Justad v. Ward, 147 Idaho 509, 512,211 P.3d 118, (2009).
One can only assume that Giesler, knowing he had paid a price per acre well below the
true fair market value for the property, agreed that if Hull would now pay the entire D.L. Evans
note, he would give Hull a one-half interest in the property, and in good faith did pay Hull
$200,000.00 on the first 40 acre subdivision, while simultaneously withholding the first D.L.
Evans note payment.
Regarding the extra 13 shares of water claimed by Giesler, the District Court reasoned
properly that as the written contract only mentioned appurtenants, that only 147 shares were
transferred, not the extra 13 shares still registered to Hull. (Memorandum Opinion p. 6;
"R" p. 193, foot note).
The irrigation equipment issue is addressed in section D. hereafter.
C.

Whether the District Court erred by fashioning a remedy for breach of contract
when Hull had failed to sufficiently prove actual or anticipated damages with
reasonable certainty and when the District Court's remedies were outside of the
relief requested by Hull, unsupported by evidence in the record or were
unreasonable, arbitrary and unenforceable; or not.
The record is replete with evidence of the new agreement, its terms and its breach. Hull's

amended complaint was legally sufficient in giving Giesler adequate notice of the relief sought.
Our Rules of Civil Procedure establish a system of notice pleading. Cook v. Skyline
Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 33, 13 P.3d 857, 864 (2000). "A complaint need only contain a
concise statement of the facts constituting the cause of action and demand for relief."
Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323,325, 715 P.2d 993,995 (1986); see also LR.C.P. 8(a)(I).
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"A party's pleadings should be liberally construed to secure a 'just, speedy and
inexpensive' resolution of the case." Gillespie v. Mountain Park Estates, LLC, 138
Idaho 27, 30, 56 P.3d 1277, 1280 (2002) (quoting Christensen v. Rice, 114 Idaho 929,
931,763 P.2d 302, 304 (Ct.App.1988) (citing LR.C.P. l(a); MT Deaton & Co. v.
Leibrock, 114 Idaho 614, 759 P.2d 905 (Ct.App.1988»). Youngblood v. Higbee, 145
Idaho 665, 182 P.3d 1199 (2008).
In Gibson v. Ada County Sheriff's Dep't, 139 Idaho 5, 9, 72 P.3d 845, 849, (2003), the
Court said "We look at whether the complaint puts the adverse party on notice of the
claims brought against it."
Regarding notice to Defendants of Plaintiff allegations, see

~Farrell

v. Brown, 111 Idaho

1027, 1033 (App.) 729 P.2d 1090 (1986) where the Court said,
"Whatever is notice enough to excite the attention of a man of ordinary prudence and
prompt him to further inquiry, amounts to notice of all such facts as a reasonable
investigation would disclose."
It is clear from Plaintiff Amended Complaint, that if not an equitable trust, then a contract

in fact as to Plaintiffs interest in one-half of the net value of future lots sold. (Hull's Amended
Complaint Count 5; "R" p. 140, 141, 143).
Hull's sale to Giesler at less than fair market value per acre, then Gieslers payment to
Hull of the $200,000.00, and Hull's agreeing to pay the D.L. Evans note, and making said
payments, coupled with Hull's claim of the one-half interest in the property and Giesler's failure
to further perform, gave plenty of notice to Giesler that Hull was damaged, either in loss of
bargain or the finding of the one-half interest, and therefore requiring Giesler to further perform.
The District Court could have rescinded the contract, ordered the land sold and divided the
proceeds, or as it did here, give Hull his one-half interest and give Giesler the opportunity to not
be in further breach of the contract.
If Hull made a bad bargain when he sold to Giesler the property for $2,500.00 per acre
rather than the existing value of$7,000.00 to $10,000.00 price per acre established at trial,
(Plaintiffs Exhibits "4" and "33-A" p. 22 of 108); then Gielser made a poor deal giving Hull a
one-half interest in the property which the district court found to be an undivided one-half
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interest in a net profit from the sale of the subdivision lots, in consideration for Hull paying the
D.L. Evans loan. Giesler paid Hull the first installment of $200,000.00 and Hull paid the first
D.L. Evans loan payment when it was withheld from the $200,000.00. The District Court also
found Hull had sufficiently made the subsequent payments. (Memorandum Opinion p. 14;
"R" p. 201). The issue of timeliness was also weighed by the Court and found to be sufficient.
(Memorandum Opinion p. 14,20-21; "R" p. 201-204 also Plaintiff's Exhibits "13" and "I3-A").
The Appellants are correct when they state that the District Court found an express
contract and therefore did not have to find on any equitable theory. Appellants concede that
Hull had an interest in the profits from the sale of subdivided lots if the D.L. Evans notes were
paid timely.
The District Court having not found any undivided legal interest in the property by Hull,
the Statute of Frauds would not apply as no legal interest in the land existed, only an interest in
net profits from future sale of subdivided lots. Also there was performance by both parties. Hull
paying the D.L. Evans notes and Giesler paying Hull for the first 40 acre subdivision.
Giesler's breach was his failure to perform on the rest of the subdivisions. Giesler agreed
that Hell could freeze over before Hull got anything more, including not being allowed to farm
the property. (Memorandum Opinion p. 20; "R" p. 207).
Again Appellant's cases cited are not on point regarding remedies fashioned by the
District Court in this case. The District Court's remedy was to find that Hull, in fact and by law,
did have an interest in the property as to a one-half net profit from sale of subdivision lots as they
occurred. Giesler breached the express agreement found by the District Court by not following
through on the development, but rather let Hell freeze over first. Therefore the District Court
could order a remedy based on each party's obligations, first by finding that ifno time is
expressed in a contract for its performance, the law implies that it shall be performed within a
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reasonable time determined by the circumstance attending the performance, thereby obligating
Giesler to further perform, (Memorandum Opinion 20 and 30; "R" p. 207 and 217-219), and
second by having Hull continue to make the D.L. Evans note payments.
Again Appellants cite cases for lack of damage proof which are not on point except,
perhaps Brown v. Yacht Club, 111 Idaho 195, 198-99,722 P. 2d 1062, 1065-66 (ct. Appl1986).
The District Court could have ruled that Giesler's breach was material and awarded monetary
damages in an amount of the difference between the sale price and the actual value of$7,000.00$10,000.00. The District Court could have based a monetary judgment on $5,000.00 per acre, the
value of Hull's share on the first 40 acre subdivision. Because of Giesler's refusal to perform
rescission could have been the remedy or even partition, but the court let both parties off the
hook on this issue and found a reasonable time to perform, and said, perform in subdividing and
selling lots and payment of the D.L. Evans Notes, or you, Giesler, will see the remaining 107
acres sold and the profit split equally, or you, Hull, will forfeit your interest. Those remedies give
Hull his expectation interest in seeing the property subdivided and the lots sold and him getting
his one-half net profit. It also gives him his reliance interest in being reimbursed if the property is
sold due to Giesler's failure to perform, as well as his restitution interest by being reimbursed for
paying the D.L. Evans note payments and selling at a significant low price. The District Court
found Hull had adequately paid on the D. L. Evans notes. (Memorandum Opinion p.l4;
"R" p. 201).
When referring to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, section 344
(1979), the Brown case p. 199, says that restitution interest,
"seeks recovery of the value of benefits bestowed, and which it would be unjust for
the other party to retain. This form of recovery is available for breach of contract."
It would be unjust to let Giesler sit on the property indefinitely and retain the farming income,

until Hull loses his interest for failure to pursue.
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The District Court did not grant specific performance, like in the sale of a unique price of
property where the only fair and just remedy would be to complete the sale, as no other remedy at
law exists. All the District Court did was find a time table, and give Hull his contractual interest.
The other remedies only apply if either party further defaults.
In Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, Count Five, Hull sets forth a contract implied in law
by the actions of the parties. The District Court found an express contract under the facts. Either
way the District Court found a contract, a breach thereof by Giesler, although not material
enough for recession, but enough to impose a time for future performance and remedies if either
party further defaulted.
Mr. Hull's prayer in his amended Complaint also asked for "all other relief that the Court
deems just and equitable in the premises." (Plaintiffs Amended Complaint; "R" p.144).
Hull also asked the District Court to amend pursuant I.R.C.P 15(b) to conform the
pleadings to the evidence, which it did. ("Tr" p. 561-562).
I.R.C.P. 54(c) says in part,
"every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is
rendered is entitled even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleading."
The determination of whether an issue, not raised by the pleadings, has been tried by
consent of the parties is within the discretion if the trial court and such determination will only be
reversed when that discretion has been abused. Smith v. King 100 Idaho 331, 335, 597 P .2d 217
(1979).
Appellants cite MK. Transport, Inc., v. Louis Grover, 101 Idaho 345,349,612 P.2d
1192, 1196 (1980) to negate Plaintiff Motion at the end of Trial to amend to conform to the
evidence pursuant LR.C.P. 15(b). The only reason addressed was whether it was tried by express
or implied consent, and did Appellants understand the issues and evidence.
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The notice issue and notice pleading have already been addressed herein. Giesler never
admitted to any agreement until forced by Hull filing a Motion to Compel Answers to
Interrogatories and Request For Production of Documents which resulted in the Answers being
filed on the 29 th day of ApriL 2013, when originally requested on December 28, 2012, ("R" p. 75
and 88).
Both issues of an equitable trust and an express contract regarding of the transfer of the
property interest were tried before the District Court. Giesler's denial of any agreement until
some 36 days before trial left Hull with no choice but to amend to include an express or implied
contract after the fact. The contract found by the District Court carne after the original transfer of
land. These issues were always on the table and they were tried in District Court.
The order by the District Court that Giesler can not further encumber the property is
logical and reasonable under the circumstances, considering Hull's D.L. Evans payments and net
profit interest in sale of lots.
Appellants citing of Schroeder v. Partin, 151 Idaho 471,259 P.3d 6] 7 (2011) does not fit
the facts of this case. First there was no liquidated damages clause, and to construe the District
Court's holding regarding further breach of the contract, as a liquidated damage clause is
incorrect, in that all the District Court did was to find a reasonable time frame for performance.
Giving Hull his one-half interest in the lot sales is not liquidated damages, but his anticipated
value of the bargain.
Again the District Court could have found damages based on the value of the property
when sold and now, or the $200,000.00 value of the first 40 acre subdivision.
Appellant's cite of Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C, 140 Idaho 354, 362, 93 P.3d
685,693 (2004), about Courts not having the power to rewrite contracts, is again missing the
point, as that the District Court did not rewrite the contract at issue. It merely found the
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reasonable time for performance as it is as allowed to do. (Weinstein v. Prudential Property &

Casualty Insurance Company, 149 Idaho 299, 233 P.3d 1221 (2010), Memorandum Opinion
p. 20; "R" p. 207).
The one-half interest to Hull was part of the contract. The other remedies of sale or
forfeiture occur only after further breach by the parties. Is it more equitable just because Hull gets
his bargain, or is it really only the intent or meeting of the minds of the parties?
"Recession is an equitable remedy that totally abrogates the contract and seeks to restore
the parties to their original positions. It is normally granted only in those circumstance in
which one ofthe parties has committed a breach so material that it destroys or vitiates the
entire purpose of entering into the contract." Health v. State, Dept. Of Admin., 137 Idaho
663,668,52 P.3d 307, (2002).
Basically the District Court only said to Giesler that if he did not want to further perform,
the Court would rescind the contract and put each party back, as close as possible, to their
respective positions as when they first entered into the second agreement. Thus, any further delay
by Giesler would constitute such a material breach as to be grounds for recession, and the sale of
the remaining 107 acres, splitting the net proceeds without reimbursement of any development
costs to Giesler, would be the proper remedy. (Judgment p. 2; "R" p. 231).
Regarding Appellant's cite of Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 215 P.3d 485 (2009),
they again missed the point as there is an abundance of evidence to support the contract as found
by the District Court. The inconvenient result is Giesler now has to perform instead of just
claiming Hull has no interest at all. Not the fault of the contract or Hull. There was no
reformation of the contract.
Given Hull's testimony as to the first 40 acre subdivision and the rest in two to three
years, and considering the time wasted from 2006-2012, and still getting 3 more years, begs the
question of reasonable time, considering Giesler's failure to produce testimony of actual time
needed. He did not want to go there. Let Hell freeze over first was his response to a reasonable
time frame. ("Tr" p. 157, L. 1-5, p. 338, L. 10-17).
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The first subdivision was completed in about one year, so one cannot say there was no
evidence of how long it takes. Any remedy for a breach of contract would be a penalty the way
Appellants describe it.
Hull asked in Count Five of his Amended Complaint for a contract to be found giving
him a one-half undivided interest in the whole property. The District Court found the interest to
undivided but only in the net profit from the sale of the remaining subdivided lots.
Hull alleged that Giesler breached the contract by stopping work on the subdivisions. The
Court found a breach, although not material.
Hull asked that because of the breach he be allowed to receive his one-half interest
unjustly retained by Giesler, by return of land, or sale at current market value of his one-half
interest. The District Court found only that Giesler had to perform or else. That was a gift to
Giesler. The Court could have said sell the property and give Hull his one-half net share now.

D.

Whether the District Court erred by only awarding Giesler one-half of the value of
the Irrigation Equipment and also ordering that the pro rata value of the Irrigation
Equipment be factored into calculation of "net profit" from the sale of subdivided
lots; or not.
The District Court found that Giesler originally claimed he owned, not just the irrigation

equipment sufficient to irrigate the property, but also all the irrigation equipment that Hull had
used to irrigate separately owned land and rental land, consisting of 700 acres more than the
property in question of 147 acres. He subsequently withdrew his claim for excess pipe and
limited his claim to 31 hand or solid set lines plus main line. (Memorandum Opinion p. 25;
"R" p. 212). The District Court found the value of said irrigation equipment to be $25,122.00.
The District COUli awarded one-half to Giesler and one-half to Hull on the theory that the
irrigation equipment would be part of the "gross" income generated by development and sale of
the subdivision.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

-/8-

The District Court went on to explain that,
"If the 147 acres could have been developed as the parties contemplated, then the
irrigation equipment would have logically been liquidated as the lots developed. There
would have been no reason to retain this equipment for farming purposes. The sale or
liquidation of that equipment would have constituted a portion of the gross (and hence,
net) revenue of the project. Thus, even though Hull did sell the irrigation equipment to
Geisler, he would have recouped one-half of the value of that upon completion of the
subdivision." (Memorandum Opinion p. 29; "R" p. 216).
Gielser never intended to farm the property when he purchased it, only after six years did
he try to claim all interest in the property, all water, and all irrigation equipment, while ignoring
his contractual obligation to complete the subdivision and pay to Hull his one-half share.
Keep in mind also that Giesler put his own wheel lines on the property, and also never
asked about pipe when the first 40 acre subdivision was completed and Hull paid. ("Tr" p. 162,
L. 16-23).
If the irrigation equipment was sold to Giesler in the original agreement, by reason of the
integration clause, then it also became part ofthe deal made and memorialized in Giesler's Notes
(Plaintiff's Exhibit "31 "), and included in the "property", and therefore made part of Hull's onehalf interest in all the property that he would get back if he paid the D.L. Evans notes. The
District Court determined it to be a conditional undivided one-half interest in the net profit of the
sale of the subdivision lots. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Giesler was buying the
irrigation equipment to separate it and sell it. It was just part of the property in the subdivisions
to be included in Hull's share of the profit. The District Court's holding is not unreasonable or
inconsistent.
Rayl v. Shull Enterprises, 108 Idaho 524, 527-528, 700 P.2d 567, 570-571 (1984) did not

say handlines were fixtures and neither did the District Court find the irrigation equipment
appurtenant to the property, but merely part of the property in which Hull had his one-half
interest in the net profit when sold.
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6.

COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL
Hull requests an award of the costs incurred in responding to this appeal pursuant to
LA.R. 40, and all reasonable attorneys fees incurred in responding to this appeal pursuant to
Idaho Law, including LA.R. 41, I.C. § 12-120(3) and LC.§ 12-121.
A.

Regarding the Purchase and Sale Agreement between the parties for the original

147 acres, the District Court found an integration clause issue, but also found a second express
contract for Hull's one-half net interest in the profits from future sales of subdivision lots in the
remaining 107 acres. Giesler did not get all the irrigation equipment he first claimed, nor the
extra 13 shares of water. (Memorandum Opinion p. 6; "R" p.193 foot note). He did however win
on the rent issue, but had to account for the grain.
In Erickson v. Flynn, Idaho Ap 138 Idaho 430. 437, 64 P.3.d 959, (Idaho App. 2002), the
Court held that where a quasi-contract claim,
" is presented in the alternative to a breach of contract cause of action as a fall-back
position in the event that the contract claim fails, and where the quasi-contract claim is
based upon the same facts and circumstances as the breach of contract claims, and the
alleged transaction is commercial in nature, the prevailing party is entitled to recovery
attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3)."
In the case at bar, the same reasoning could be used when both theories are plead,
regardless of which prevails, and when the facts and circumstances are the same. Hull prevailed
on his over all claim of a one-half interest in the property, and therefore should be awarded his
costs and attorney fees as the ultimate prevailing party. Gielser's position was that Hull get
nothing. Hull however prevailed and received his one-half share.
B.

Idaho Code § 12-120(3) provides that in any commercial transaction, the

prevailing party shall be allowed attorneys fees. As to the second agreement or contract between
the parties, Hull prevailed and secured his rightful one-half share in the property remaining.
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The District Court gave its reasoning in (Memorandum Opinion p. 39-40;
"R" p. 226-227), and concluded no fees should be awarded to either party.
If Hull is found to be the prevailing party on the Appeal by Giesler, Hull respectively
requests an award of its costs and attorneys fees pursuant to said section.

C.

Hull further seeks an award of costs and attorneys fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121.

Said fees are appropriate here if the Appeal has been brought or defended frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation.
"Respondents are entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal where nonprevailing
party invited the Court of Appeals to do no more than second-guess the trial court on
conflicting evidence and where the law was well-settled." Blaser v. Cameron, 121 Idaho
1012, 829 P.2d 1361 (Ct App. 1991).
Hull found himself in a tough situation when Giesler told him to get off the land in 2012
and not expect to receive anymore profit from the uncompleted subdivisions. Suit was filed and
the District Court found in his favor as to his expected bargain, that he recover a one-half interest
in the net profits from the sale of subdivision lots. The other issues, won or lost by the parties,
were essentially accounting issues which had arisen over time between the parties. Hull
ultimately prevailed on the key issue.
The Appeal brought by Giesler is a further attempt to deny Hull anything after selling at a
huge loss in the first instance and then having to make the D. L. Evans note payments at a further
loss.
The District Court found plenty of evidence of this agreement and Giesler wants nothing
to do with it. Let Hell freeze over first.
Who then is being unreasonable, frivolous and without foundation in law or fact, ifnot
Giesler as he still wants to rob Hull of his property interest and any chance to recoup his loss.
The District Court simply did not err in its findings of fact and application of the law, and
therefore the Court cannot have those findings of fact and conclusions of law set aside as clearly
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erroneous. Just beeause one party is unhappy or upset at the result, should not warrant an appeal
only to attack the findings of fact and conclusions of law which are supportable, but not in
appellants favor. Hull requests that the Court award him his costs and attorneys fees incurred in
responding to this appeal pursuant to said sections.
7.
CONCLUSION

The District Court held the original written agreement sold Giesler 147 acres, sufficient
irrigation pipe and equipment for 147 acres, and water for only 147 acres. The integration clause
in said agreement prohibited any prior deals between the parties. The District Court then found a
second unwritten agreement that gave Hull his claim of an interest in the remaining 107 acres, of
an undivided one-half interest in the net profit from the sale of all future lots in the subdivisions
as completed. The District Court also found sufficient evidence of the second agreement, in
Giesler's notes (Plaintiff's Exhibit "31 "), in the payment to Hull of the $200,000.00 on the first
40 acre subdivision, and in Hull's subsequent payment of the D.L. Evans note payments. The
facts and Law supporting the District Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as to the
second agreement cannot be set aside as erroneous.
The District Court found Giesler to be in breach of the second agreement, though not
fatally. It also found a reasonable time to perform said agreement, intended from the subject
matter of the contract, the situation of the parties, and the circumstances attending the
performance.
The District Court's remedy was for Giesler to perform within a reasonable time limit,
and Hull to be paid accordingly his one-half share of net profit from the sale of remaining lots, as
long as he paid the D.L. Evans note payments when due.
These rulings were not outside the scope of Hull's pleadings considering Hull's prayer,
for any and all other relief that the court deems just and equitable in the premises, and his motion
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to amend to conform the pleadings to the evidence offered at bench trial that was granted by the
District Court under LR.C.P. 15(b), and Giesler's failure to object thereto. That is not to say, that
the pleadings in his amended complaint failed to state sufficient facts and legal claims to put
Giesler on notice, enough to excite the attention of a man of ordinary prudence, as well as being
in compliance with LR.C.P. 8 (a)(I). Whether an issue has been tried with consent, is a matter of
the trial courts's discretion. The District Court granted Hull's LR.C. P. 15(b) motion.
All Giesler's lamentations about lack of notice as to pleadings and Hull's filing an
amended complaint after Giesler was four months late with his discovery i.e., (Plaintiffs Exhibit
"31 "), and having previously denied in his answer that Hull had any interest what so ever in the
property, are just because he does not want to perform as he had agreed.
There was no question but what Hull was damaged by Gielser's failure to perform. Hull
the same as gave Giesler the land in the first agreement and in the second he agreed to pay the
D.L. Evans note in order to be assured of getting his one-half interest in the net profit of lot sales.
Land values of$7,000.00-$10,000.00 per acre were testified to without opposition. The first 40
acre subdivision was completed in a year and payment of $200,000.00 to Hull by Giesler
($5,000.00 per acre) was made. Given those values one can conclude what was at stake and
Hull's damages if not paid.
Regarding the value of the irrigation equipment going one-half to Hull, the District Court
reasoned properly. Giesler had no intention of farming the property until 2012, six years later in
an attempt to seize all of Hull's interests. It was as the District Court said, "it would have been
eventually sold as part of the subdivision development," (Memorandum Opinion p. 26;
"R" p. 213), making it part of the gross income generated. Not an unreasonable finding of fact
and law.
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Appellants do not meet the standards of review sufficient under the law to hold the
District Court's findings of fact to be clearly erroneous, and once so found this Court cannot set
them aside. Neither have they shown the conclusions of law to be unsupported by the findings of
fact. The Court should not substitute its own view of the facts either. Appellants only ask this
Court to second guess the District Court's finding of fact and conclusions oflaw.
Hull, therefore respectfully requests that the District Court's opinion and judgment be
affirmed, with costs and attorney fees to Respondent.
Oral argument is requested.

Dated this 29 th
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 29th day of January ,2014, I caused two true and
correct copies of the foregoing document to be served, pursuant to LA.R. 20 and LA.R. 34, upon
the following person in the following manner:

Andrew Wright
166 Eastland Dr. North Suite A
P.O. Box 226
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303
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